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AUGUSTINE'S TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FREE WILL DEFENCE 
Rowan A. Greer 
Augustine's first conversion is to the Christian Platonism of his day, which 
brought along with it a free-will defence to the problem of evil. Formative as 
this philosophical influence was, however, Augustine's own experience of 
sin combines with his sense of God's sovereignty to lead him to modify the 
views he inherited in significant ways. This transformation is demonstrated 
by setting Augustine's evolving position against that of Gregory of Nyssa. 
Truth! Truth! How the very marrow of my soul within me 
yearned for it as they [the Manichees]l dinned it in my ears over 
and over again! To them it was no more than a name to be 
voiced or a word to be read in their libraries of huge books. But 
while my hunger was for you, for Truth itself, these were the 
dishes on which they served me up the sun and the moon, beau-
tiful works of yours but still only your works, not you yourself 
nor even the greatest of your created things .... 
Augustine, Confessions 3.6 
So Augustine in his mid-forties looks back at the nineteen year old 
youth he once was. His reading of Cicero's Hortensius had persuaded 
him to abandon the study of the law with its dreams of a career in the 
imperial civil service and to become a teacher in order to embark upon 
the quest for truth. At least that is the way it looks to him in hindsight, 
and from the same perspective he sees that he had followed false paths 
until the child's voice heard in the garden at Milan commanded him to 
pick up Paul's letters and to read the thirteenth chapter of Romans. The 
conversion Augustine describes in Book 8 of the Confessions led to his 
resignation of the chair of rhetoric he held, to an extended retreat at 
Cassiciacum outside Milan where he wrote the earliest works that sur-
vive, and to his baptism in 387. 
There can be no doubt that the Christianity Augustine embraced was 
the Christian Platonism we find in both Greek and Latin, in Ambrose 
and Marius Victorinus as well as in the Cappadocians. We should not, I 
think, imagine that Augustine first assents to neo-Platonism and then 
becomes Christian. Instead, it is his early conviction that Plato and his 
followers, were they to come to life again, would see in the church their 
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own message proclaimed persuasively to alP Even the later Augustine 
does not abandon this perspective entirely. His lyrical description in 
Confessions 7 of what he finds in the "Platonic books" focusses upon the 
Platonic - or even the Plotinian - teaching about the soul. "These books" 
(almost certainly Marius Victorinus' Latin translations of Plotinus) 
"served to remind me to return to my own self." He discovers that God 
alone is absolute Being and Truth, while the soul exists and possesses 
truth and goodness only by participating in God. 
In this way the void resulting from Augustine's rejection of 
Manichaean dualism disappears for him. He now sees that evil is not a 
substance, co-eternal with good, but instead is the deprivation of good. 
In other words, he now sees that the Christian Platonist ideal of contem-
plation and of the ascent of the soul to God is correlative with what we 
may call his version of the free will defence, involving as it does the idea 
of evil as the privation of good and so as "non-being."3 To be sure, 
Augustine realizes that these Platonic ideas must be Christianized; and 
he points out that though the Platonic books conform to the prologue to 
John's Gospel, they lack any reference to the Word made flesh. 
Nevertheless, he has found a road map for his own life as a Christian. It 
remains for him to follow that map, a possibility given him by his con-
version in the garden.4 
That Augustine's conversion was to the Christian Platonism of his 
day finds clearest confirmation in the simple fact that his early writings 
contain no allusion to his later - and idiosyncratic - doctrines of original 
sin and prevenient grace. Let me cite some passages from Of True 
Religion, probably written in 393 and sent to Paulinus of Nola in 394 as 
part of what Paulinus called Augustine's "Pentateuch against the 
Manichees." In the treatise Augustine insists upon human freedom and 
does so by employing a metaphor he will later transform in terms of his 
predestinarian schema. The church is God's threshing floor. "On this 
floor everyone voluntarily makes himself either corn or chaff." (OTR 
vi.10) There is no question of a depravity inherited from Adam. It is 
only the "death of the body" that represents Adam's legacy. (OTR xii.2S, 
xv.29) This legacy does not prevent humans from choosing the good. 
"[Sjin is so much a voluntary evil that it is not sin at all unless it is vol-
untary." (OTR xiv.27)i "Por divine providence has so moderated our 
punishment that even in this corruptible body it is permitted to us to 
work towards righteousness .... " (OTR xv.29) To be sure, we need educa-
tion and healing; but any Christian Platonist would say the same thing. 
The point is that the early Augustine has not yet concluded that we are 
born not only mortal but also spiritually dead and condemned to eternal 
damnation. 
Similarly, the early Augustine contents himself with the usual 
Christian Platonist view that God persuades but never coerces. The 
Word incarnate "did nothing by violence, but everything by persuasion 
and warning." (OTR xvi.31) "His whole life on earth as Man, in the 
humanity he deigned to assume, was an education in morals." (OTR 
xvi.32) God has dispensed the two testaments like a wise physician, and 
we can remember that the ancients understood the doctor's work as a 
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persuasive art, necessarily limited by the exigencies of the disease. (OTR 
xvii.34) The persuasive character of God's providence expresses itself in 
the rewards and punishments that are consequent upon our exercise of 
freedom. Thus, neither the tree in paradise nor God's command not to 
eat of it were evil. Rather, the transgression of God's command was evil 
and so brought upon our first parents God's "just condemnation." That 
condemnation, however, carried with it something educative, sc. the 
power to distinguish good and evil. "When the soul has become 
involved in its sin, it learns, by paying the penalty, the difference 
between the precept it refused to obey and the sin which it committed. 
In this way it learns by suffering to know the evil it did not learn to 
know by avoiding it." (OTR xx.38) Augustine speaks of God's persua-
sive providence in a way that would be congenial to Origen or Gregory 
of Nyssa; he does not speak of God's prevenient or operative grace, a 
grace that cannot be resisted.6 
If Augustine's early theology is Christian Platonist in character and 
lacks his later doctrines of original sin and operative grace, we must 
explain why he elaborates these later ideas. I wish to suggest that it is 
Augustine's increasing recognition that the Christian Platonist theology 
fails to fit his own experience in crucial ways that leads him towards his 
mature theology. Of course, he never repudiates Christian Platonism, 
but his novel ideas transform the view with which he begins. One can, I 
think, see this happening in his earliest writings. He wrote the Soli-
loquies at Cassiciacum in 386. In this work he reproduces the common 
idea that a period of moral purification will enable the soul to ascend to 
God; the soul's "eyes" will see God. But he also betrays his own despair 
of healing. There are dark forces within him that he can neither under-
stand nor control, and they act as an obstacle to healing and so call into 
question the basic assumptions of the religious view to which he had 
committed himself. 
If this interpretation is convincing, it follows that the first step 
Augustine takes is to explain his spiritual condition as the product of the 
Fall. The legacy of Adam involves more than mortality; it renders all 
humans incapable of good in any true sense. Moreover, our radical 
incapacity necessitates an appeal to God's sovereignty. The basic 
Christian Platonist pattern remains - we have been made to participate 
in God, and our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Him. (Conf. 
1.1) But the restless heart from its birth moves away from God, 
deprived of good and full being. Only God's sovereign grace can 
reverse that movement of deprivation, and grace will finally become not 
only sovereign but also selective. What I am suggesting is that a double 
religious perspective explains Augustine's transformation of the 
Christian Platonist conventions. His deep sense of human incapacity, 
combined with an insistence upon God's sovereignty effects a sea 
change upon the theology he inherits. As will be seen, I wish to explain 
Augustine's development without appealing to the various polemical 
contexts for his writings. It seems to me misleading to suppose that he is 
a Pelagian in refuting the Manichees, and a Manichee in refuting to 
Pelagians.7 It is, therefore, with this general assessment of Augustine's 
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development in mind that I wish to examine On Free Will. This treatise 
seems to me transitional, moving towards the mature view. Perhaps 
more important, it enables us to understand how Augustine transforms 
the Christian Platonist theodicy. 
Gregory of Nyssa's Christian Platonist Theodicy 
Before turning to On Free Will, however, let me seek to describe the 
view of evil that Gregory of Nyssa elaborates in his Catechetical Oration. 
We cannot claim, of course, that Augustine knew this work, even 
though he does seem to have read some of the Cappadocians' writings 
in Latin translation." Nevertheless, there are several reasons for starting 
with Gregory's theodicy. In its main outline it articulates the view we 
find everywhere, even in the early Augustine's works. Moreover, 
Gregory clearly treats the view as one that should be taught to those 
preparing for baptism; the Catechetical Oration purports to outline the 
instructions catechists are to give. Thus, we are dealing with a religious 
view that Gregory supposes to be the church's teaching for all its mem-
bers. Finally, and perhaps paradoxically, the theology Gregory elabo-
rates presses the logic of the free will defence in a direction quite the 
opposite of the one Augustine will take. 
The Catechetical Oration begins with an account of the Trinity and of 
creation. God created humanity so that humans could share in God's 
goodness. Gregory presupposes that the image of God is the created 
likeness that enables us to know God, who is the Good, and to translate 
that knowledge into virtue. Towards the end of section 5 he points out 
that "our present situation" does not correspond to the ideal picture he 
has drawn. Instead, we find that "human life is at present in an unnatur-
al condition." He resolves the problem thus raised by treating a mutable 
freedom as the cause of evil (CO 5; LCC 3, pp. 277f.): 
The existence of evil did not have its origin in the divine 
will. For no blame, indeed, would attach to evil, could it claim 
God as its creator and father. But evil in some way arises from 
within. It has its origin in free will, when the soul withdraws 
from the good. For as sight is an activity of nature and blind-
ness is a privation of natural activity, so virtue is in this way 
opposed to vice. Just as darkness follows the removal of light 
and disappears in its presence, so, as long as goodness is present 
in a nature, evil is something nonexistent.... Since, then, it is the 
mark of free will to choose independently what it wants, God is 
not the cause of your present woes. For he made your nature 
independent and free. The cause is rather your thoughtlessness 
in choosing the worse instead of the better. 
By "evil" Gregory means the evil we do and not the evil we suffer. By 
"free will" (proairesis) he means our capacity to choose, and he thinks of 
that capacity as the soul's movement towards good or towards evil. We 
do not, I think, have any notion of the will as a human faculty in contrast 
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to the intellect. Instead, the will is the activity of the soul or personality 
in choosing. 
Gregory continues his argument by saying that vice and evil are not, 
properly speaking, the opposites of virtue and good. Rather, they are 
privations and so have no independent existence. It is in this sense, first 
of all, that evil is "non-being." We must add two points. First, to say 
that evil is the privation of good and has no independent ontological sta-
tus need not mean that evil has no reality or that it is purely passive in 
character. "If a man in broad daylight of his own free will closes his 
eyes, the sun is not responsible for his failure to see." (CO 7) Gregory, in 
this way, can treat evil as a rebellion against the good and so leave room 
for the Biblical idea of sin as rebellion against God. Second, it is not only 
humans who misuse their mutable freedom to deprive themselves of 
good, but also Satan and his angels who do so. Gregory complicates the 
Platonist view by tying it to the Biblical story. Adam and Eve are, to be 
sure, responsible for their disobedience; but the temptation of Satan is an 
explanation of the Fall and so supplies a mitigating factor. Despite these 
complications we can describe Gregory's view as follows: God is not the 
cause of evil; rather, the misuse of a mutable freedom by angels and 
humans to turn from God, good, and being towards evil and non-being 
is the cause of evil. 
The question that obviously presents itself is why angels and humans 
should misuse their capacity to choose the good. Gregory has nothing to 
say from this point of view about the angels. Unlike Augustine he fails 
to worry about why creatures who presumably know the good should 
fail to act upon that knowledge. With respect to humanity, however, 
Gregory has a persuasive answer. In the passage I have cited above he 
speaks of "thoughtlessness." Later in the Catechetical Oration he explains 
our choice of evil by using the story of Aesop's dog, who drops the real 
bone to seize its reflection in the water. (CO 21) The implication, surely, 
is that the choice of evil is really a mistake about the good. No one 
deliberately chooses evil (pace the later Augustine and Milton's Satan, 
who says "evil be thou my good."). Instead, our immaturity leads us to 
choose a specious good instead of the true good. Ignorance correlates 
with vice the way knowledge does with virtue. Like the child who has 
the capacity to walk but can learn to exercise that capacity only by stum-
bling, so we have the capacity to choose the good but learn to use it only 
by trial and error. In other words, Gregory explains evil by placing it in 
a narrative of human development. 
One further point can be made. Immediately before his reference to 
Aesop's dog Gregory argues that as creatures we are always subject to 
change and that change takes two forms. As a movement towards the 
good "its progress is continual, since there is no conceivable limit to the 
distance it can go." If the Good is infinite, we can progress towards it 
forever. On the other hand, Gregory implies that since evil is somehow 
bounded by good, our movement towards it is limited. In this way he 
lays one foundation for his spiritual ideal of epektasy (perpetual pro-
gress in the good) and for his universalism.9 In the long run everyone, 
even Satan, will mature and learn to walk the path that leads to infinite 
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Good, to God. And, of course, it is God who heals and trains freedom 
for this end. We must, then, turn to Gregory's understanding of God's 
providence. 
If free will explains the origin of evil, we must ask how God responds 
to the evil thus introduced into a good creation. Gregory's answer to this 
question hinges upon the necessity of admitting that God permits evil. 
That is, if God gave the mutable freedom misused by angels and 
humans, we are obliged to say that while he does not cause evil, he per-
mits it. The mother who gives the keys of the car to her sixteen year old 
boy does not cause the accident; but she does permit it. God's permis-
sion of evil, then, represents a voluntary relinquishment of his sover-
eignty.TO Gregory ties this idea to an Origenist understanding of the rela-
tion of providence to freedom. Providence is not antecedent to freedom, 
but in the first instance simply supplies the context in which we exercise 
freedom. It is a general and universal divine operation, and it is persua-
sive in character. God's providence like a parent's love does not compel. 
The effect of God's providence, however, differs depending upon how 
we use it. Rightly used, providence benefits us; wrongly used, it has a 
punitive effect. And since the punishment is one we bring upon our-
selves, it is justly retributive. But it is also, mysteriously, remedial. 
God's punishments are always healing and educative; the same Greek 
word means both punishment and education. In the Catechetical Oration 
Gregory employs this schema to explain Satan's fate. His punishment is 
justly retributive; the deceiver is himself deceived. But it is also remedi-
al; Christ "freed man from evil, and healed the very author of evil him-
self." (CO 26) 
Gregory, I think, sees clearly that his view amounts to a denial that 
God remains in sovereign control of evil. To be sure, one could argue 
that a self-limitation is not a true limitation; but there can be no question 
that God abandons his exercise of sovereignty, and equally no question 
that he will regain his full sovereignty only when he has persuaded all to 
be voluntarily subject to himself. Gregory, however, takes one further 
step. He suggests that, paradoxically, God's apparent loss of sovereign-
ty may in fact be a sign of his true power. The Pauline paradox of power 
effected through weakness may lie behind his argument. The incarna-
tion is God's chief remedy for evil. Just as we are not surprised by a 
flame that shoots upwards but regard a flame moving downwards as a 
marvel, so we are more amazed that God embraced the weakness of our 
nature than that he created the universe. (CO 24) Perhaps we can say 
that a sovereignty effected by persuasion has more value than one 
brought about by coercion. 
As we shall see, many of the conventions Gregory employs and all 
the conclusions he draws from them pose serious difficulties for 
Augustine. At the human level, can we explain our choice of evil as an 
immature mistake about the good? Do we never knowingly choose evil? 
Will all be saved? At the divine level, can we admit that God abandons 
his sovereignty? Is providence merely persuasive? Are God's punish-
ments always remedial? These questions lead Augustine to transform 
and so to obscure the view that Gregory elaborates. Gregory's theory, as 
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a theory, is fairly impressive. To put it in terms of the way people have 
usually posed the question of theodicy since the time of Epicurus,ll in 
the short run Gregory insists upon God's goodness and the existence of 
evil, but denies God's omnipotence. In the long run, however, he insists 
upon God's goodness and omnipotence, but denies that there will be 
any evil. Evil is non-being not merely because it has no independent 
existence, but also because it has no final existence. Gregory's solution 
depends upon placing his theodicy in the context of a narrative. We can 
make the same judgement with respect to Augustine. But the stories, 
though both Christian, are quite different. 
Augustine's On Free Will 
In his Retractions (I.ix) Augustine describes his treatise as follows: 
While we were still delayed at Rome we determined to discuss 
the question of the origin of evil. The principle on which the 
discussion was to proceed was this. We were to try if possible 
to let rational argument, so far as we could with God's help in 
our discussion, demonstrate to our intellects what we already 
believed about the matter on divine authority. After careful rea-
soning we agreed that evil has no other origin than in the free 
choice of the will. 
It seems to me that we can take this description seriously. The treatise 
itself begins with Evodius' question: "Tell me, pray whether God be not 
the author of evil." In other words, the treatise is primarily an attempt 
to think through and to raise questions about the Christian Platonist free 
will defence and only secondarily a polemical response to Manichaeism. 
It seems unlikely that it is one of the anti-Manichaean treatises known to 
PauIinus of Nola in 394, since Augustine sends it to PauIinus a year or 
more later. (Epist. 31) Moreover, even though Augustine in his 
Retractions goes on to tell us that he began the treatise in 387/388 while 
still in Rome but completed Books II and III in Africa after his ordination 
to the priesthood in 391 (possibly as late as 395 or 396), nevertheless he 
gives no indication that his view changes during the writing of the trea-
tise. 
For these reasons I wish to argue for two basic presuppositions. First, 
we cannot explain tensions and apparent contradictions in the work by 
appealing to a change in Augustine'S views during the writing of the 
treatise. Second, we should not be misled by some of his other remarks 
in the Retractions so as to treat the work as primarily a treatise against 
the Manichees. To be sure, Augustine is embarrassed by the use of the 
treatise by the Pelagians to show that Augustine was "pleading their 
cause." He rebuts this claim by denying his views changed and by 
claiming that "even in these books On Free Will which were written not 
at all against them, for they did not yet exist, but against the Manichees, 
I have not been completely silent about the grace of God, which in their 
horrible impiety they are endeavouring to abolish." This retrospective 
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judgement says more about the later place of the treatise in the Pelagian 
controversy than about its original purpose. And, I think, while 
Augustine is correct that its argument does not support the Pelagians, he 
is disingenuous to suggest that its point of view can be identified with 
his mature view. In sum, we need to examine On Free Will as an explo-
ration of the Christian Platonist free will defence, designed to uncover 
its weaknesses by pressing its logic. 
The structure of the argument demonstrates that Augustine is willing, 
at one level, to accept the free will defence. Book I carefully shows that 
evil in the true sense is the evil we do rather than the evil we suffer and 
that it is the product of voluntary wrong-doing. In other words, God 
does not cause evil; rather the misuse of a mutable freedom is the cause 
of evil. Augustine elaborates this view by defining voluntary wrong-
doing as a violation of the eternal law stamped upon our minds, a viola-
tion that prevents the mind from fulfilling its task as the governing prin-
ciple of the body and the bodily passions. This positive exposition, how-
ever, yields a problem which Augustine addresses in I.xii.24ff. and to 
which he returns in I1I.xvii.47. What I wish to suggest is that Augustine 
accepts the usual explanation but believes that it fails to explain why 
humans (and angels) would misuse God's gift of free will. 
Augustine is more concerned to demonstrate that God is not the 
cause of evil, even indirectly by giving free will. The argument of Book 
II insists that God exists (iii.7-xv.39), that all good things are from God 
(xv.40-xvii.46), and that free will "is to be numbered among the things 
which are good." (xviii.47-xx.54) In one sense, the argument boils down 
to the assertion that God's gift of free will was designed to enable us to 
cleave to "the unchangeable good" and so find happiness and that the 
misuse of the gift does not affect its goodness. At the same time, 
Augustine also implies that the misuse of freedom in no way compro-
mises God's sovereignty, a point he argues in lII.v.12-xvi.46. Once again 
Augustine accepts the free will defence as a way of denying that God is 
the cause of evil, but he carefully avoids speaking of God's permission 
of evil. A second problem, then, emerges. Granted that evil originates 
in the misuse of God's gift of freedom, can we maintain that God 
remains sovereign once evil has entered his creation? It begins to look 
as though faith cannot find full understanding. The argument has 
become so "circuitous" that it is not fully convincing.12 
Let me turn to the first of the problems that Augustine's argument 
raises. Why do humans misuse their freedom?!3 In Book I Augustine 
repeatedly emphasizes the capacity of free will for good. The "ruling 
mind" cannot be compelled to desert virtue by what is superior, since 
what is superior must also be just. Nor can it be subverted by anything 
inferior to it, since what is inferior must be weak. "So our argument 
teaches us: Nothing makes the mind a companion of cupidity, except its 
own will and free choice." (I.xi.21) Nothing is so completely "within 
the power of the will" as the will itself; and one may, therefore, have a 
good will "by willing it simply." (I.xii.26) By pressing the logic of the 
Christian Platonist understanding of free will Augustine arrives at the 
following conclusion (l.xiii.29): 
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Hence it follows that whoever wishes to live rightly and hon-
ourably, if he prefers that before all fugitive and transient goods, 
attains his object with perfect ease. In order to attain it he has to 
do nothing but to will it. 
This conclusion means that happiness is within our easy grasp, and 
Evodius says he "can hardly refrain from shouting for joy, when I find I 
can so quickly and so easily obtain so great a good." 
But Evodius has been trapped, and his joyful shout is premature. 
Augustine's argument, I think, is made of straw. Though consistent and 
logical, it shatters against the realities of our world. If we can find hap-
piness so easily, "[w]hy, then, do not all obtain it?" Clearly all people 
wish to be happy, but equally clearly most are unhappy. Why? 
Augustine answers the question as follows (Lxiv.30): 
So when we say that men are unhappy voluntarily, we do not 
mean that they want to be unhappy, but that their wills are in 
such a state [in ea valuntate sunt] that unhappiness must follow 
even against their will. 
What does he mean? My suggestion is that Augustine here intro-duces 
a novel distinction between "free will" (liberum arbitrium) and the "will" 
(valuntas). He repeatedly uses the expression "the free choice of the 
will," and in this way treats the relation of the two terms as correlative 
with motive and act. That is, "will" is a way of speaking of what moti-
vates our "free choices."J4 
We can argue, further, that by "will" Augustine does not mean a dis-
tinct human faculty as though we could oppose the will to the intellect. 
On the contrary, he simply elaborates the Christian Platonist under-
standing of free will by distinguishing choice from the fundamental pos-
ture or orientation of the mind that motivates choicesY Thus, we remain 
able to choose happiness; but this choice is blocked and undermined by 
our condition and our fundamental orientation. The evil or perverse 
will (II. xiv.37) is, then, a way of speaki,ng of our "penal state" of ig-
norance and difficulty. We are unable to know the good and incapable 
of doing it. (IILxviii.51-52) This is our inheritance from Adam and 
explains why "man [sic] cannot rise of his own free will as he fell by his 
own will spontaneously." What remains is to "hold with steadfast faith 
the right hand of God stretched out to us above, even our Lord Jesus 
Christ." (ILxx.54) 
Even though Augustine articulates his view in somewhat different 
terms from those we find later in the City of God, the Enchiridian, and the 
anti-Pelagian writings, there can be little doubt that his problem with the 
free will defence has led him to a doctrine of original sin. We inherit 
from Adam not only mortality but also an incapacity for the good which 
vitiates even our choices of happiness. The Christian Platonist idea that 
we have the capacity of choosing good or evil now attaches only to 
Adam and Eve before the fal1. 16 An obvious problem follows (III. xix. 53): 
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If Adam and Eve sinned, what have we miserable creatures 
done to deserve to be born in the darkness of ignorance and in 
the toils of difficulty, that, in the first place, we should err not 
knowing what we ought to do, and, in the second place, that 
when the precepts of justice begin to be opened out to us, we 
should wish to obey them but by some necessity of carnal lust 
should not have the power? 
Augustine replies to this objection by appealing to those who have been 
"victorious over error and lust" by seeking God's help. Though we are 
radically incapacitated by the fall, the one capacity we retain is the abili-
ty "to turn to God, and so overcome the punishment which had been 
merited by the original turning away from God .... " (III.xix.53-xx.55) 
If Augustine's first problem with the free will.defence (why do we 
misuse a mutable freedom?) leads him to a doctrine of original sin, the 
second problem (how can we square God's sovereignty with the exis-
tence of evil?) does not at first seem to produce so radical a step. The 
implication of the passage to which I have just referred is that God's 
help and grace are available to all who seek it. We do not yet have 
Augustine's later view of prevenient or sovereign grace. Here we can 
summon grace; later it will be only grace that can summon us. At the 
same time, we do find in On Free Will the insistence upon God's sover-
eignty that contains the seeds of the later view. The first part of Book III 
reflects Augustine's preoccupation with this theme. He begins by argu-
ing that God's foreknowledge of sin cannot be equated with his foreor-
dination of sin. We do not determine what we remember. Similarly, 
God does not determine what he foresees. (III.ii.4ff.; III.iv.9-11) God, of 
course, is eternal; and so "He determined once for all how the order of 
the universe he created was to go on, and he never changes his mind." 
(III.iii.6) Evodius may not be putting the point as clearly as he might, 
but Augustine would accept the idea that God orders the universe in a 
sovereign way. At the same time, we can distinguish two forms of 
ordering (III.v.17): 
Reason judges by the light of truth, and correctly subordinates 
lesser things to those that are greater. Utility, guided by experi-
ence of convenience, often attributes a higher value to things 
which reason convinces us are of lesser rank. 
While he does not make the correlation clear. Augustine appears to have 
this sort of distinction in mind when he speaks of God's ordering of the 
moral universe. "All must be contemplated in the light of the perfection 
of the universe." This implies that had there been no sin God would 
have ordered the universe according to reason, placing each being in its 
proper place in the whole. But the universe "is no less perfect because 
there is misery for sinners." Again by implication, the order of utility 
integrates sin into the total picture. "Hence the penal state is imposed to 
bring it into order, and is therefore in itself not dishonourable. Indeed it 
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compels the dishonourable state to become harmonized with the honour 
of the universe, so that the penalty of sin corrects the dishonour of sin." 
(III.ix.25-26) 
Augustine leaves open the possibility that evil might not have entered 
creation. But his concern is to argue that its entrance in no way compro-
mises God's sovereignty. God "did not make them [all natures] in order 
that they might sin, but that whether they willed to sin or not to sin they 
might be ornaments of the universe." (IIl.xi.32) Moreover, there "is no 
interval of time between failure to do what ought to be done and suffer-
ing what ought to be suffered, lest for a single moment the beauty of the 
universe should be defiled by having the un comeliness of sin without 
the comeliness of penalty." (III.xv.44) Only small steps are necessary to 
take these ideas to the conclusions that Augustine will later draw. God's 
ordering of the universe involves the ordering of good and evil together 
to make up a total good. This means that evil is no longer non-being but 
is instead the antithesis of good. 17 And it explains how God, at least in 
the first instance brings good out of evil; he does so by punishing evil 
and so making it subject to his sovereign ordering of the universe. 
These ideas, however, are more implicit than explicit in On Free Will. 
Conclusion 
Let me begin by seeking to summarize my argument. In On Free Will 
Augustine accepts the Christian Platonist free will defence as the faith he 
seeks to understand. By pressing its logic he finds two problems that do 
not lead him to abandon the view but that do require him to modify it. 
The first of these problems is why we misuse our freedom. His attempt 
to solve this difficulty leads him to a distinction between free choice and 
the will, as the basic orientation of the mind, and to a doctrine of original 
sin, sc. that we inherit from Adam not only mortality but an incapacity 
for the good. The second of these problem is how to reconcile the exis-
tence of evil with God's sovereignty. His solution does not deny the 
availability of divine assistance and grace, since the one capacity we 
retain after the fall is the ability to seek God's help. But he does argue 
that God remains sovereign even after the introduction of evil into the 
universe, because God by punishing evil orders it together with its 
antithesis good to make up a total good. The solutions Augustine offers 
do not, I think, reject the free will defence. But they do restrict it to 
Adam and Eve before the fall, and they have the effect of giving a sea 
change to the usual Christian Platonist view. 
Within a year or two of On Free Will Augustine adopts his mature 
view of operative or sovereign grace, thus completing his mature theodi-
cy. That view is really intelligible only when placed in a narrative con-
text. I should describe it as follows. God created Adam and Eve 
"upright," capable of knowing the good and so exercising their mutable 
freedom so as to do the good. They had the possibility of not sinning, 
and by saying this Augustine means that they were created so that they 
could easily actualize the possibility. We cannot explain why they failed 
to do so any more than we can explain why the evil angels, created to 
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know the good, fell and failed to do the good. Indeed, Augustine sees 
the horror of the fall as tied to its meaninglessness and to the fact we 
cannot explain it. We cannot explain why Adam, knowing the good, 
would fail to do it; nor can we find any efficient cause of the evil will 
that motivated his disobedience. Evil, then, though the product of angel-
ic and human misuse of created freedom, is in the final analysis inexplic-
able. But its consequence for us, who inherit Adam's penalty, is cata-
strophic. We are born mortal, spiritually dead and so incapable of good, 
and doomed to eternal death. We might suppose that God has in this 
way lost control of his universe. Not so. God orders evil together with 
good, integrating evil into the total good of the universe. And he does 
this by punishing evil, thereby subjecting it to his sovereignty and bring-
ing good out of evil. Nevertheless, quite gratuitously God demonstrates 
his mercy by selecting some humans out of the mass of perdition for 
redemption. His prevenient grace frees their wills from bondage to sin 
and so enables them to begin to turn towards the good. Grace, there-
fore, is selective and sovereign. The elect remain convalescent in this 
life, but in the age to come they find their place with the blessed angels 
in the City of God where they will have the impossibility of sinning. 
The final picture is one of the two cities ordered together by God to 
make up a total good. 
What are we to make of this picture? The free will defence has not 
disappeared, but Augustine has restricted it to an explanation of the ori-
gin of evil. And the story he has elaborated raises, I think, theoretical 
difficulties impossible to resolve. It is difficult to avoid concluding that 
human freedom has disappeared. To be sure, Augustine can argue that 
we retain the capacity to choose even though that capacity is now 
restricted to the choice of evil. But this scarcely seems convincing. If we 
have no capacity for the good, surely we can give no satisfactory account 
of the moral universe. Vice and virtue, reward and punishment become 
meaningless terms; and all the stock arguments used by the church 
fathers to defend free will come into play. Still more difficult, do we not 
have two contradictory theories of evil? From the point of view of its 
origin evil is the privation of good and has no ontological status. But in 
terms of God's dealings with evil, it is something, sc. the antithesis of 
good. The privation/non-being theory implies that evil need not exist. 
The antithesis/ ordering theory implies the necessity of evil in a 
chiaroscuro vision of the universe. Finally, what sort of God emerges? 
If God's permission of evil is forced into an equation not with his good 
relinquishment of sovereignty but with his sovereign bringing of good 
out of evil by punishing it, then it is hard to see that God is good as well 
as omnipotent. 
In sum, it seems to me that the story Augustine tells ends by obscur-
ing the free will defence and by introducing logical and philosophical 
absurdities into his theodicy. At the same time, this is not what I wish to 
conclude. In my view, it is a mistake to treat Augustine as a philoso-
pher. He surely is aware of the difficulties I have listed. His concern, I 
should argue, is not to construct a persuasive theory, but to find a way 
of articulating his deepest religious convictions. He finds in himself an 
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incapacity for good that leads him to suppose he cannot in any way help 
himself. But the miracle is that God has helped him, broken his chains, 
given him the medicine that will work for his cure in the age to come. 
Augustine's theology, as I think, is designed to explain this experience. 
Looked at as a set of theories his theology is unpersuasive and repellant. 
Treated as a way of arguing that though we cannot help ourselves God 
in Christ has helped us, his theology takes on a persuasive character 
despite the theoretical and philosophical problems it raises. 
Yale Divinity School 
NOTES 
1. The Manichees were dualists, believed in a first principle of evil, and 
identified matter and the body with evil. In the west they tended to appear 
as a dualistic form of Christianity. See the discussion in Peter Brown, 
Augustine of Hippo (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1967), pp. 46H. 
2. See Of True Religion iv. 6-7 (LCC 6, p. 229): "If Plato and the rest of 
them, in whose names men glory, were to come to life again and find the 
churches full and the temples empty, and that the human race was being 
called away from desire for temporal and transient goods to spiritual and 
intelligible goods and to the hope of eternal life, and was actually giving its 
attention to these things, they would perhaps say ... That is what we did not 
dare to preach to the people .... So if these men could live their lives again 
today ... they would become Christians, as many Platonists of recent times 
have done." 
3. I should perhaps add that the Christian Platonist version of the free 
will defence depends upon arguing that God alone is absolute good. Thus, 
the good for creatures depends upon participation in God; evil is the priva-
tion of this participation. 
4. I am, of course, thinking of Confessions 7.21: "It is one thing to descry 
the land of peace from a wooded hilltop and, unable to find the way to it, 
struggle on through trackless wastes where traitors and runaways, cap-
tained by their prince, who is lion and serpent in one, lie in wait to attack. It is 
another thing to follow the high road to that land of peace, the way that is 
defended by the care of the heavenly Commander." 
5. In his Retractions Augustine tries to get round the obvious meaning 
of this passage. (See LCC 6, p. 219) His attempt to argue that his opinions 
have not changed seems scarcely persuasive. 
6. Augustine's later view is that because of original sin humans can no 
longer will the good. Only God's grace can free them from their bondage to 
sin. Thus, grace is a sovereign act of God that comes before (is prevenient of) 
any human movement towards good. More generally, Augustine sees grace 
as sovereign throughout the Christian life. Hence, the term "operative 
grace" can refer to God's grace both before and after election has taken 
place, that is, to the grace of perseverance as well as to prevenient grace. The 
main point is that the later Augustine, at least by implication, understands 
grace as coercive rather than persuasive. 
7. The Pelagians insisted that we must make the first move towards 
God, after which He comes to our assistance. This view can be taken so far 
as to suggest that God's grace is restricted to the law which, in principle, 
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humans can obey. Thus, it is easy to associate an insistence upon free will 
with Pelagianism and to equate the Manichaean view with a denial of free-
dom. An insistence upon freedom refutes Manichaean dualism, while refut-
ing the Pelagians might seem to require a denial of freedom. The Pelagians 
used Augustine's On Free Will to refute his later view. Augustine's response 
in his Retractions is to deny that his view has changed and to say that the 
apparent contradiction may be explained by the anti-Manichaean purpose of 
On Free Will. Thus, Augustine is himself partly responsible for attempts to 
explain his thought primarily by reference to its polemical contexts. 
8. See Eugene TeSelle, Augustine the Theologian (London: Burns & Oates, 
1970), pp. 116, 149f., 294-96. 
9. By universalism I mean two things. First, Gregory is clear in stating 
his conviction that evil has no final existence. See, e.g. On Making of Man 21.2 
(NPNF 2.5, p. 411): " ... as evil does not extend to infinity, but is compre-
hended by necessary limits, it would appear that good once more follows in 
succession upon the limit of evil.. .. " Gregory continues by employing the 
analogy of an eclipse, arguing that the conical shadow caused by the eclipse 
is bounded by light on all sides. Second, universalism means that all, even 
Satan, will be saved. Punishments after death will be remedial. See 
Catechetical Oration 26 (LCC 3, p. 204): "In this present life patients whose 
cure involves surgery and cautery grow incensed at their physicians when 
they smart under the pain of the incision. But if by these means they are 
restored to health and the pain of the cautery passes off, they will be grateful 
to those who effected their cure. It is the same with the evil which is now 
mingled with our nature and has become a part of it. When, over long peri-
ods of time, it has been removed and those now lying in sin have been 
restored to their original state, all creation will join in united thanksgiving, 
both those whose purification has involved punishment and those who 
never needed purification at all." Cf. CO 35. 
10. See Catechetical Oration 15: "Why, then, if he [Godlloved man, did he 
not wrest him from the opposing power and restore him to his original state 
by some sovereign and divine act of authority [di' authentikes finos kai theikes 
exousiasl. ... ? See also Catechetical Oration 24: " ... that the omnipotent nature 
[pantodynamon physinl was capable of descending to man's lowly position is 
a clearer evidence of power [dynameosl than great and supernatural mira-
cles." Gregory does not deny that God's nature is almighty [pantodynamon], 
but he argues that this omnipotence at the level of redemption expresses 
itself in persuasive rather than coercive ways, in weakness rather than in 
strength. 
11. As cited by Lactantius in De Ira Dei 13 (ANF 7, p. 271): "God, he 
[Epicurusl says, either wishes to take away evils, and is unable; or He is 
able, and is unwilling; or He is neither willing nor able; or He is both willing 
and able. If He is willing and is unable, He is feeble ... if He is able and 
unwilling, He is envious ... if He is neither willing nor able, He is both envi-
ous and feeble ... if He is both willing and able, which alone is suitable to 
God, from what source then are evils? Or why does He not remove them?" 
12. For the theme of "faith seeking understanding" see I.ii.4, l.xi.23, II.i.1, 
lLii.5, II.xv.39. The "circuitous" (in tanfos circuitus disputationis) character of 
the guest appears at II.xviii.47. Cf. De trinitate 15.28 where Augustine'S con-
clusion to the treatise would appear to be that faith in the Trinity cannot find 
sufficient understanding, at least in this life. 
13. Augustine does not here treat the fall of the angels. Cf. City of God 
11.11, 12.6, 12.9 where he cannot explain why the evil angels fell. Were the 
angels created unequal? Did some receive more grace than the others? 
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14. This interpretation depends partly upon resisting the temptation to 
understand voluntas as a faculty (the will) distinguishable from the intellect. 
It seems to me important to remember that voluntas can mean "wish" or 
"desire." On Free Willl.xii.25 demonstrates that Augustine thinks of voluntas 
as an attitude, the desire of the mind: "Ev.- What is a good will? Aug.- A 
will to live rightly and honorably and to reach the highest wisdom. Just see 
whether you do not desire (adpetas) to live a right and honourable life, 
whether you do not eagerly desire to be wise (esse sapiens velis), or whether 
at least you would venture to deny that when we wish (volumus) such things 
we have a good will." On Free Will I.xiii.27 associates the "good will" with 
the cardinal virtues, which are adfectiones a11imae. Thus, the "will" is equated 
with the mind's desire and the good will with the virtues. 011 Free Will Il.i.3 
suggests that this desire motivates our actions: si enim homo aliquod b011um est 
et non posset, 11isi cum vellet, recte facere, debuit habere liberam voluntatem, sine 
qua recte facere 110n posset. See also II.ii.4: Sic nemo possct per voluntatem peccare, 
si voluntas data est ad recte faciendum. 
15. Cf. Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, Volume Two: Willing (New 
York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), pp. 87 and 93f., where 
she argues that Augustine contrasts will and performance. She regards 
Augustine as "the first philosopher of the will" and begins her discussion by 
describing the way Augustine sees the will as divided against itself. She dis-
tinguishes Augustine's idea from Aristotle's doctrine of "deliberation" by 
arguing that Augustine's will is concerned with ends, whereas Aristotle is 
speaking of means. (p. 96) Let me cite portions of two of her summations. P. 
95: "First: the split within the Will is a conflict, and not a dialogue, and it is 
independent of the content that is willed. A bad will is no less split than a 
good one and vice versa. Second: the will as commander of the body is no 
more than an executive organ of the mind and as such quite unproblemat-
ic .... " P. 104: 'To summarize: this Will of Augustine'S, which is not under-
stood as a separate faculty but in its function within the mind as a whole, 
where all single faculties-memory, intellect, and will-are "mutually 
referred to each other," finds its redemption in being transformed into 
Love.' If Augustine distinguishes liberum arbitrium from voluntas, he also dis-
tinguishes both from libertas. Freedom refers to the healed will and to the 
overcoming of its division by cleaving to God. See On Free Will ILxii.37: 
"Herein is our liberty, when we are subject to truth. And Truth is our God 
who liberates us from death, that is, from the condition of sin." 
16. Note II.xx.54 where he says he does not know the cause of Adam's 
choice--cf. the end of the Book III where we have immaturity as a possible 
explanation, but one he does not use in the earlier argument. 
17. It might be possible to reconcile evil as the privation of good with evil 
as the contrary of good. Indeed, this would be one way to read Plotinus, 
Ennead 1.8. Here Plotinus accepts the idea that evil is privation and non-
being-but not non-being in an absolute sense (1.8.3: outi to pantelos me on). 
But he wishes to get round the Aristotelian arguments that privation can 
only exist in a subject and so cannot have independent existence, and that 
existing things need not have contraries. He does so by arguing that evil as 
the total privation of good is the last limit of the procession of reality from 
the One. (1.8.7) Thus, evil, while not the equal opposite of good, is its con-
trary, since it is located at the lowest point in the great chain of being. 
Plotinus' discussion refers to Theaetetus 176a, where Socrates says: "Evils, 
Theodorus, can never be done away with, for the good must always have its 
contrary; nor have they any place in the divine world; but they must needs 
haunt this region of our mortal nature." Plotinus' argument remains in many 
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respects puzzling. See J.M. Rist's discussion "The Descent of the Soul" in 
Plotinus: The Road to Reality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 
pp. 112ff. It seems to me doubtful that Plotinus is the major source of 
Augustine's notion of evil as the antithesis of good. E. TeSelle's observations 
about the theme of "order" in Augustine are helpful. See op. cit. p. 118: 'When 
Augustine uses the term ordo it soon loses the Ciceronian and Plotinian 
meanings it had in the early dialogues and comes to be employed almost 
exclusively in a rather different sense, probably conveyed through Varro .... 
Order in this sense consists, then, in the "coordination" of component parts 
or the "right ordering" of one's own attention and affection.' See also his dis-
cussion of Augustine'S understanding of providence (pp. 219ff.), where 
God's extrinsic governance includes the "Permission and overruling evil." 
